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WATERS AND WATER COURSES-GAME:
WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD FOR ELEVEN THOUSAND
FEDERAL WETLAND EASEMENTS IN NORTH DAKOTA?
United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459 (8th Cir. 1996)
I. FACTS
Kerry Johansen and Michael Johansen (Johansens) own farmland in
Steele County, North Dakota.l In the 1960s, the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) purchased federal wetland easements from the
Johansens' predecessors. 2 These easements are located on farmland
tracts currently farmed by the Johansens.3 The FWS purchased wetland
easements on approximately 1,033 acres of the Johansens' land. 4
Specifically, the FWS purchased easements for farmland tracts 21X (a
half section), 24X (a half section), and 30X (a half section plus eighty
acres). 5 Prior to 1976, the FWS standard easement document delineated
1. Appellants' Brief at 1, United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459 (8th Cir. 1996) (No.
95-3996ND).
2. United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459, 460 (8th Cir. 1996), The easement conveyance was
made subject to the standardized terms then used by the FWS for most wetland easement acquisitions.
Id. at 461. According to standard FWS practice at the time, the Johansens' easement documents
contained a legal description of the entire tract of land, i.e., quarter section, half section, or section.
Id. The remainder of the easement document used by the FWS in this case stated in relevant part:
The parties of the first part, for themselves and for their heirs, successors and
assigns, covenant and agree that they will cooperate in the maintenance of the aforesaid
lands as a waterfowl production area by not draining or permitting the draining, through
the transfer of appurtenant water rights or otherwise, of any surface water including
lakes, ponds, marshes, sloughs, swales, swamps, or potholes, now existing or reoccurring
due to natural causes on the above-described tract, by ditching or any other means; by
not filling in with earth or any other material or leveling, any part or portion of the
above-described tract on which surface water or marsh vegetation is now existing or
hereafter reoccurs due to natural causes; and by not burning any areas covered with
marsh vegetation. It is understood and agreed that this indenture imposes no other
obligations or restrictions upon the parties of the first part and that neither they nor their
successors, assigns, lessees, or any other person or party claiming under them shall in
any way be restricted from carrying on farming practices such as grazing, hay cutting,
plowing, working and cropping wetlands when the same are dry of natural causes, and
that they may utilize all of the subject lands in the customary manner except for the
draining, filling, leveling, and burning provisions mentioned above.
Appellants' Brief at app. 6, Johansen (No. 95-3996ND) (emphasis added). Considerable comment
has been made about the "now existing or reoccurring due to natural causes" language in these
pre-1976 easements. One might ask, reoccurring from what point in time? Although the court in
Johansen did not directly address this question, a valid argument can be made that "reoccurring" can
logically be read to mean "whenever" occurring if at any point in time the land was susceptible to
becoming a wetland. Arguably, it would have to mean "whenever" occurring or otherwise "now
existing" would be superfluous. If such a reading of this easement is accepted, the Johansen court's
revised interpretation of the scope of pre-1976 federal wetland easements is unnecessary.
3. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 460.
4. Id. at 461.
5. Id. The Johansens' predecessors were paid $600 for each of the easements purchased on
tracts 21X and 24X, and $700 for tract 30X. Id.
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the entire tract of land in its legal description. 6 However, for each of the
recorded easement conveyances, the FWS prepared an administrative
Easement Summary. 7 These summaries, though not a part of the
easement document itself, provided information such as tract description,
tract acreage, wetlands acreage, and cost per wetland acre.8 Thus, while
the easement document itself described the easements as encumbering
the entire tract of land, the corresponding Easement Summaries actually
represented that the FWS purchased 101 acres of wetland for the three
tracts in question. 9
The spring of 1995 was the second consecutive wet spring in Steele
County.10 As a result, the Johansens were having difficulty farming their
land due to excessive surface and subsurface water.11 In January, 1995,
Kerry Johansen requested that the FWS inform him what water he could
drain so he could resume normal farming practices. 12 While claiming to
be sympathetic to the Johansens' plight, the FWS nonetheless responded
that any wetlands developed during wet years still remained subject to
easement restrictions. 13 The FWS maintained that only in the event that
the Johansen's farmstead or roads became endangered could they drain
any water off the encumbered tracts. 14 Notwithstanding the FWS'
6. Id. at 462.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 461-62; see also Murray G. Sagsveen, Waterfowl Production Areas: A State Perspec-
tive, 60 N.D. L. REV. 659, 684-85 (1984) (discussing the negotiation and transaction process between
the FWS and landowner). Sagsveen gave the following explanation of what role the Easement
Summaries played in the negotiation process:
[After a landowner offers to sell a wetland easement], the FWS will assess the value of
the tract for migratory waterfowl and will calculate the number of wetland acres on the
tract. The FWS then prepares an 'easement summary,' which contains the legal
description of the tract... the wetland acreage, the total acreage of the tract, the wetland
cost per acre, and other data.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). In the Johansens' case, the easement conveyance docu-
ments described the easements as encumbering the entire tract of land, while the accompanying
Easement Summaries represented that the FWS purchased 33, 33, and 35 acres of wetland, respec-
tively, on each of the tracts in question. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 462. In fact, the FWS publishes annual
reports in which it still maintains that it controls 33 acres on tract 21X, 33 acres on tract 24X, and 35
acres of wetlands on tract 30X. Id. In contrast, easements negotiated after 1976 did contain maps
locating the particular wetlands subject to the easements terms. Id. at 463. That is, for post-1976
easement agreements, the FWS produces a map that is recorded as part of the easement document.
This map essentially puts the landowner on notice as to the location of the covered wetland acreage
not subject to drainage.
10. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 462.
11. Id. Because of two unusually wet years in Steele County, the water table had risen and
wetlands that had usually dried up over the summer either had remained full or at least remained wet
much longer than usual. Brief of Appellee at 1, Johansen (No. 95-3996ND). Some of the Johansens'
farmland could not even support farm machinery due to excessive moisture. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 462.
12. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 462 (citing Letter from Kerry Johansen to Hoistad (Jan. 1, 1995) (Ex.
D-120)).
13. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 462.
14. Id. The responding letter from the FWS stated in relevant part:
[Y]our area has been hard hit in the last two years .... This particular tract of land has
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position, the Johansens dug ditches on portions of the three tracts to
drain the excess water. 15 As a result, the United States brought misde-
meanor charges against the Johansens for unauthorized draining of
federal wetlands, a violation of 16 U.S.C. § 668dd.16
As part of their defense, the Johansens sought to present evidence
that in spite of their ditching activities, the wetland acreage remaining
still exceeded the acreage described in the Easement Summaries that had
been prepared by the FWS at the time the easements were purchased.
17
In a motion in limine, the United States argued that such "acreage
limitation defenses" had been rejected by the Eighth Circuit.IS Relying
on United States v. Vesterso,19 the United States District Court for the
District of North Dakota ruled that the Johansens' acreage defense was
improper and therefore excluded the proffered evidence. 20  The
a high number of basins on it. This, I'm sure, combined with the high rain amounts has
caused you some difficulty farming in the past year .... The only provisions of the
easement that allow for drainage are when [there] are safety or health concerns
involved. Another way of saying this is unless your roads or farmstead is in danger of
being flooded, no drainage can take place.
Id. (citing Letter from Hoistad to Kerry Johansen (Mar. 17, 1995) (Ex. D-121)).
15. Id. The Johansens alleged that in 1995 there were 83.8, 64.9, and 67.1 acres of wetland on
tracts 21X, 24X, 30X, respectively. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 462 n.3. However, it should be noted that
although the court in Johansen seems to have adopted some of the Johansens' factual claims, the
district court did not make any findings of fact regarding any of these claims. Id.
16. Id. Section 668dd(c) provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall knowingly disturb,
injure, cut, burn, remove, destroy, or possess any real or personal property of the United States,
including natural growth, in any area of the [National Wildlife Refuge] System." 16 U.S.C. §
668dd(c) (1994).
17. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 462. The Johansens termed this their "acreage defense." See
Appellants' Brief at 1-3, Johansen (No. 3996ND) (explaining the background and theory behind the
"acreage defense"). Specifically, the Johansens explained the "acreage defense" as follows:
The [Johansens'] acreage defense ... concedes for purposes of the criminal prosecution
against them the reported number of wetlands acreage per tract, as being restricted by
the [FWS] easement. However, if, for example, a tract's ... reported wetlands acreage
is 33 acres, and if after the draining activities of a farmer there yet remains more than 33
acres of wetlands, then the 'acreage defense' involves proving that more than 33 acres
of wetlands remained undrained as a matter of fact, and then arguing to the jury that the
United States has exactly what it got in the easement, and that is at least 33 acres of
wetlands, undrained and undisturbed by any draining activities of defendants.
Id. at 16 (emphasis original). According to the Johansens, the "reported number of wetlands per
tract" consisted of the number of acres which the FWS reported as being subject to federal wetland
easement restrictions in the North Dakota litigation. Id. at 17-20 (citing North Dakota v. United States,
460 U.S. 300, 311 (1983)); see also infra note 74 (explaining the position taken by the FWS with regard
to the number of wetland acres as being applied to gubernatorial consent limits). The FWS' "reported
number" of acres subject to easement restrictions came directly from the number of wetland acres as
reported in the Easement Summaries. See infra note 74.
18. United States v. Johansen, No. C3-95-62, slip op. at 1-2 (D.N.D. Nov. 14, 1995) (order
denying defendants' "acreage defense" and related theories).
19. 828 F.2d 1234, 1241-42 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a defendant charged with damaging
property subject to a federal wetland easement could not defend on the basis that the federal
government had not ensured compliance with gubernatorial consent limitations by identifying all
wetlands covered by the federal easements).
20. Johansen, No. C3-95-62, slip op. at 1-2.
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Johansens subsequently entered conditional pleas of guilty, pending the
appeal of the district court's evidentiary ruling. 21
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the
district court's interpretation of Vesterso regarding the scope of federal
wetland easements. 22 Reviewing the district court's pretrial order de
novo, the court reversed,23 holding that federal wetland easements are
limited to the acreage as specified in the Easement Summaries, and
remanded the case for action consistent with the opinion.24
This Comment will review the historical development of the federal
waterfowl production area program, including the cooperative efforts of
North Dakota with the federal government in this program and the
eventual dissipation of that relationship. This Comment will then exam-
ine case law from the United States Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals that previously interpreted the scope of federal wetland
easements and established the government's burden of proof in wetland
easement Violation cases. Following the discussion of prior case law, this
Comment will review the rationale and holding in United States v.
Johansen.25 Finally, this Comment will discuss the potential impact of
Johansen on this particular federal wetland conservation program,
specifically focusing on the United States' ability to enforce over 11,000
federal wetland easements in North Dakota.
II. LEGAL HISTORY
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WATERFOWL PRODUCTION AREA
PROGRAM
The nation's obligations to migratory birds first originated nearly
eighty years ago when Congress enacted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(Treaty Act of 1918) in 1918.26 The Treaty Act of 1918 protected
21. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 462.
22. Id. at 468. The court in Johansen noted that "the district court's decision was predicated on a
fundamental (albeit understandable) misinterpretation of this circuit's case law with respect to the
scope of federal wetlands easements." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 466, 468. Specifically, the court held:
[T]he United States' wetland easements acquired title on the acreage specified in the
Easement Summaries .... [T]he government must ... prove that the defendant drained
the Summary Acreage covered by the federal wetland easement. The converse is also
true: a defendant must be permitted to introduce evidence proving that they did not drain
the Summary Acreage.
Id. at 468.
25. 93 F.3d 459 (8th Cir. 1996).
26. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Pub. L. No. 65-186, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1994)). Prior to the enactment of the Treaty Act of 1918, virtually
no protection existed for migratory birds in the United States. GuY A. BALDASSARRE & ERic G. BOLEN,
WATERFOWL ECOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT 10 (1994). For example, there were no restrictions on bag
limits, hunting hours, gun size, or the number of shells a gun could hold, and spring hunting, the use of
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migratory birds primarily by regulating the hunting, capture, possession,
and sale of migratory birds. 27 It soon became evident, however, that the
protections offered by the Treaty Act of 1918 would be only partially
successful if crucial habitats were not also targeted to be preserved and
managed for migratory birds. 28 Thus, in 1929, Congress enacted the
live decoys, and the sale of harvested ducks were all legal. Id. As a result, market hunting flourished
in this country around the turn of the century, and was having a drastic impact on the migratory bird
population. Id. Beginning around 1900, various measures were proposed in Congress intending to
curb the effects of such widespread market hunting. Id. at 520-22. The early measures largely
centered around various hunting regulations for waterfowl. Id. These early efforts usually failed,
however, because of the prevailing view that hunting regulations remained within the jurisdictional
power of the states. Id. at 520-21; see, e.g., United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154, 159 (E.D. Ark.
1914) (holding that migratory birds were owned by the states in their sovereign capacity and that this
control was one that Congress had no power to displace). The federalism obstacles faced in the
courts, and hostility in Congress, led to a shift in strategy by the leaders of the migratory bird
preservation efforts. See BALDASSARRE, supra, at 521. The federalism and jurisdictional disputes
began to fade when a resolution was successfully proposed authorizing the President of the United
States to initiate international conventions for the protection of migratory birds. Id. These conventions
established a means for preparing treaties that, if ratified, would likely remove the federalism issue
from further constitutional challenges. Id. In 1916, officials in Canada and the United States finally
produced the Migratory Bird Treaty and President Woodrow Wilson signed the Migratory Bird Treaty
on August 18, 1916. Id. This treaty opened the door for the Treaty Act of 1918, which regulated the
hunting, capture, possession, and sale of migratory birds. Id. at 522. The states, however, did not give
up without a fight, as the State of Missouri soon led the challenge to federal intervention in the
regulation of migratory birds in the seminal case Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In that
case, Missouri sought to enjoin a United States game warden from enforcing federal regulations
enacted pursuant to the Treaty Act of 1918 on the grounds that the statute unconstitutionally interfered
with rights reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 430. The State bolstered its
argument by pointing to an earlier federal statute that regulated the taking of migratory birds, which
had not been passed pursuant to an international treaty, and had been held unconstitutional in lower
courts on the grounds that the birds were owned by the states in their sovereign capacity and were
therefore immune from federal regulation under the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 432; see also Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914). However,
Justice Holmes countered that if the treaty was valid, then there could be no challenge to the validity
of the statute under Article I, Section 8, as a "necessary and proper means to execute the powers of
the Government." Holland, 252 U.S. at 432. Justice Holmes concluded that the treaty was valid
primarily because migratory birds did not respect national boundaries and were therefore appropriate
subjects for regulation by agreement with other countries. Id. at 434-35. Finally, Justice Holmes
found that even if the states were capable of effectively regulating migratory birds, nothing in the
Constitution prohibited the federal government from acting by means of a treaty to deal with a
"national interest of very nearly the first magnitude... [that] can be protected only by national action
in concert with that of another power." Id. at 435.
27. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, sec. 2, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§
703, 712 (1994)).
28. BALDASSARRE, supra note 26, at 524. The alarming rate of destruction of wetland resources in
the United States at the turn of the century was fueled by the attitude that wetlands were waste areas
in need of being made useful. As Baldassarre and Bolen explained:
[The trend of wetland destruction] began with the colonization of North America and the
quest for productive land, and steadily increased as technology improved and human
populations expanded. Wetlands, it seemed, were 'useless' obstacles in the march of
civilization toward its vision of 'progress' in fulfillment of the nation's Manifest Destiny.
Id. at 13-14 (citations omitted). Legislation toward that end began with the Swamp Land Acts of 1849,
1850, and 1860, which gave federally owned wetlands back to the states for "reclamation." Id. at 456
By the mid-1950s, these programs had transferred nearly half of the nation's original wetlands from
federal to state control, most of which ultimately fell into private ownership. Id. (citations omitted).
The result of this attitude toward wetlands was discussed in a 1976 United States Senate Report, which
stated: "There were originally approximately 127 million acres of wetlands in the area which forms
the 48 contiguous States. By 1955, this total acreage had been reduced to approximately 74 million
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Migratory Bird Conservation Act (Conservation Act),29 which authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to acquire land for use as "inviolate sanctu-
aries for migratory birds." 30 Notably, the Conservation Act accommo-
dated the federal-state relationship by conditioning state land acquisition
on state consent. 31 North Dakota consented to participation in the
program in 1931.32
In 1934, Congress passed the Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act
(Stamp Act) 33 to provide the Secretary of Interior with a funding mecha-
nism for the acquisition of migratory bird sanctuaries as required by the
Conservation Act.34 The Stamp Act funded the program via the sale of
bird hunting stamps, commonly known as duck stamps. 35 The duck
stamp proceeds formed a "migratory bird conservation fund" to be
used to purchase and maintain bird sanctuaries. 36
The federal migratory bird preservation effort subsequently shifted
its strategy away from creating large waterfowl sanctuaries toward the
preservation of small wetlands on private property. 37 As such, the Stamp
Act was amended in 1958 to give the Secretary of the Interior
authorization to acquire small marshes, potholes, and sloughs, which
acres of which only 22.5 million acres were significant value in the conservation of migratory
waterfowl." S. REP. No. 94-594, at 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 271,272.
29. Migratory Bird Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 70-770, ch. 257, 45 Stat. 1222 (1929) (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 715-715s (1994)). The enactment of the Conservation Act has been
characterized as the beginning of a "national thrust for the steady acquisition of waterfowl habitat."
BAUDAsSARRE, supra note 26, at 525.
30. Migratory Bird Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 70-770, ch. 257, sec. 5, 45 Stat. 1223 (1929)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 715d(2) (1994)). Although § 5 was amended by § 5(a) of the Fish
and Wildlife Improvements Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-616, 92 Stat. 3113, the "sense of the language,
however, was not altered." North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 302 (1983) (referring to 16
U.S.C. § 715d (Supp. V 1976)).
31. Migratory Bird Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 70-770, ch. 257, sec. 7, 45 Stat. at 1223 (1929)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 715f (1994)). See Sagsveen, supra note 9 at 660 (characterizing
the inclusion of the state's consent as a condition to land acquisition as an "unusual accommodation").
32. Act of Mar. 2, 1931, ch. 207, § 1, 1931 N.D. Laws 360 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT.
CODE § 20.1-02-18 (1991)).
33. Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act, Pub. L. No. 73-124, ch. 71, 48 Stat. 451 (1934) (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 718-718j (1994)).
34. Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act, Pub. L. No. 73-124, ch. 71, sec. 4, 48 Stat. 452 (1934)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 718d(b) (1994)).
35. North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 302 (1983).
36. Id.
37. BALASSARRE, supra note 26, at 535. The strategy shifted because not all wetlands were of a
size that required protection as a federal refuge. Id. Since many small wetlands, even isolated
potholes or sloughs, were valuable as waterfowl habitat, an efficient means for acquiring these areas
was needed. Id. In United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974), the court described the
characteristics of a prairie pothole region and its value as habitat for waterfowl:
Each square mile of such land is dotted by approximately 70 to 80 potholes of three to
four feet deep .... [T]he potholes usually retain water through July or August, and
therefore, provide an excellent environment for the production of aquatic invertebrates
and aquatic plants, the basic foods for breeding adult ducks and their offspring. Essential
to the maintenance of the land as a waterfowl production area is the availability of
shallow water in these numerous potholes during the usually drier summer months.
Id. at 908 (citations omitted).
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were to be designated as Waterfowl Production Areas. 38 Since waterfowl
production areas did not have to be maintained as sanctuaries, 39 there
was no need for them to be purchased outright.40 Therefore, the United
States' was vested with the authority to acquire easements that prohibited
landowners from draining their wetlands or otherwise destroying the
wetlands suitability as migratory breeding grounds.4 1
Shortly after the 1958 amendment, it became evident that revenues
from the Conservation Fund could not finance such a massive land
acquisition program.42 Thus, Congress created an additional source of
funding via the Wetlands Act of 1961 (Wetlands Loan Act), which
authorized an interest-free loan to go into the Migratory Bird Conserva-
tion Fund.43 Significantly, in step with the Conservation Act of 1929, the
Wetlands Loan Act accommodated the federal-state relationship by
conditioning state land acquisition on the consent of the governor or
appropriate State agency. 44
B. NORTH DAKOTA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE FEDERAL WETLANDS
CONSERVATION PROGRAM.
North Dakota initially cooperated with federal efforts to preserve
vital migratory bird habitats.45 In fact, by 1958, the United States had
38. Sagsveen, supra note 9, at 660. Specifically, the amendment gave the Secretary of the
Interior authorization to purchase a new type of property, "small wetland and pothole areas, interests
therein, and rights-of-way to provide access thereto," and these small wetlands or pothole areas were
"to be designated as 'Waterfowl Production Areas."' § 2-3, 72 Stat. 487 (1958) (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § 718d(c) (1994)). The Johansens' easements were purchased pursuant to this
amendment to the Stamp Act. United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459, 461 (8th Cir. 1996).
39. See North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 303 (citing to 16 U.S.C. § 718d(c) (1982) and stating that
waterfowl production areas could be "acquired without regard to the limitations and requirements of
the Migratory Bird Conservation Act').
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Sagsveen, supra note 9, at 660. In the years following World War II, the funds derived from
the sale of duck stamps could not alone stem the destructive tide of immense wetland losses.
BALDASSARRE, supra note 26, at 533-34. Congress responded accordingly with the Wetlands Loan Act
of 1961. Id.
43. Wetlands Loan Act, Pub. L. No. 87-383, secs. 1, 3, 75 Stat. 813 (1961) (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § 715k-3, 4 (1994)).
44. Wetlands Loan Act, Pub. L. No. 87-383, sec. 3, 75 Stat. 813 (1961) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. 715K-5 (1994)). In North Dakota, the United States Supreme Court distinguished the
Wetlands Loan Act's enabling provision from the Conservation Act:
[The Loan Act provides that] no land shall be acquired with moneys from the migratory
bird conservation fund unless the acquisition thereof has been approved by the Governor
of the State or appropriate State agency. This proviso is in addition to the Conservation
Act's requirement in its § 7, that the State "shall have consented by law" to the
acquisition of land for inviolate bird sanctuaries. The latter requires consent by the
legislature; the former requires consent by the Governor or the "appropriate State
agency."
North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 303 n.3 (citations omitted).
45. See North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 304 (discussing the relationship between the federal
government and North Dakota regarding the federal wetland conservation program); see also Amicus
Brief of North Dakota at 2, United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-3996ND)
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acquired more than 276,000 acres of land in North Dakota for use as
waterfowl refuges.46 Soon after the passage of the Wetlands Loan Act in
1961, the FWS sought the necessary consent from then Governor
William L. Guy for further land acquisitions in the State. 47 Between
1961 to 1977, Governors Guy and Arthur A. Link consented to the
acquisition of approximately 1.5 million acres of wetland easements. 48
Although the gubernatorial consents specified the maximum wetland
acreage that could be acquired within each county, particular tracts of
land were not further specified.49 Since North Dakota wetlands were
targeted by the FWS as a national priority, 50 the FWS faced substantial
pressure to meet the ambitious goals that they had described to
Congress.51 By 1977, the FWS had purchased 11,685 wetland easements
in North Dakota,52 totaling nearly one-half of the total wetland acreage
authorized by the gubernatorial consents.5 3
In the mid-1970s, the cooperation that had marked the joint effort
between the FWS and North Dakota began to break down.54 Although
the source of the dispute was not altogether clear,55 some landowners, 56
(describing the relationship between North Dakota and the federal government as a partnership that
"began amicably").
46. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 305.
47. Sagsveen, supra note 9, at 661. Promptly after the passage of the Loan Act, Governor Guy
was contacted by FWS officials concerning federal acquisition of waterfowl production areas in
North Dakota. Id. Initially, Governor Guy consented to the acquisition of easements over 1.2 million
acres of wetlands in North Dakota for waterfowl production areas. Id.; see also North Dakota, 460
U.S. at 305 (discussing generally the State's role at the beginning of the program).
48. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 305.
49. Id.
50. See Sagsveen, supra note 9, at 662 (citing to S. REP. No. 94-594, at 3 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 271, 273). The FWS ranked the prairie pothole states of North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Montana (a prime breeding region) as being its top priority among 32 geographical
locations in the United States for waterfowl habitat acquisition efforts. Id. The concentration by the
FWS on this region stemmed from its estimate that this region "continue[d] to be drained at some
35,000 acres annually, a rate at which the [FWS'] acquisition program has slowed by as much as
15,000 to 20,000 acres per year." Id. at 14.
51. Sagsveen, supra note 9, at 662. The FWS had fallen short of the wetland acquisition goals it
had set for itself between 1962 through 1976 by over 600,000 acres. S. REP. No. 94-594, at 2.
Moreover, in 1975, the FWS had revised its acquisition goals and identified an additional 1.3 million
acres of prime wetland habitat. Id.
52. Amicus Brief of North Dakota at 3, United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459 (8th Cir. 1996)
(No. 95-3996ND). In Steele County, the Johansens' home county, Governor Guy authorized the
acquisition of 9,618 acres of wetland. Id.
53. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 305.
54. Id. at 306.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Werner v. United States Dep't of Interior, 581 F.2d 168, 169 (8th Cir. 1978)
(finding that oral representations made to farmers by FWS agents concerning the scope of wetlands
easements did not accord with the terms of the written easements); United States v. Schoenborn, CR
No. 81-0145, slip op. at 9 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 1982) (finding that "[tihere was significant evidence at
trial to support defendant's contentions that the [FWS] agent . . . made unauthorized oral
representations which were inconsistent with the written terms of the easement and map"). Indeed,
misrepresentation claims were raised by landowners as a way to recover damages for oral
misrepresentations made to them by FWS agents during wetland easement negotiations. See, e.g.,
Werner, 581 F.2d at 171. These claims were generally dismissed, however, because such
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and the State of North Dakota maintained that it was caused by certain
practices of the FWS.5 7 Whatever the source of the dispute, by the early
1970s the United States began prosecuting farmers for waterfowl ease-
ment violations. 58 This controversy, stemming from alleged question-
able practices in the acquisition of wetlands easements and subsequent
prosecutions, caused the North Dakota Legislature to review the
federal-state waterfowl habitat preservation effort.59 As a result, North
Dakota enacted legislation in 1977 which intended to restrain further
federal purchases of wetland easements in the state.60
Two years later, the United States, at the request of the FWS, sued
the State of North Dakota, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1977
state legislation restricting further federal acquisition of wetland ease-
ments was unconstitutional. 61 The United States District Court for the
District of North Dakota granted summary judgment for the United
misrepresentations were deemed to be unauthorized acts and the United States was not bound thereby.
See, e.g., id.
57. Brief for the State of North Dakota at 30-33, North Dakota (No. 81-773); see also Amicus
Brief of North Dakota at 3, Johansen (No. 95-3996ND). In her amicus brief, the North Dakota
Attorney General described the source of the federal-state dissolving partnership in wetlands
preservation as follows:
A number of federal actions disrupted the partnership and were inconsistent with
Congressional intent that the state play a prominent role in the conservation program.
Misrepresentations were made to landowners by FWS acquisition agents. Another
irritant was the FWS's purchase of easements on strategically located wetlands to
prevent construction of publicly-sponsored drainage projects. These actions, in effect,
pre-empted state regulatory authority.
Amicus Brief of North Dakota at 4, Johansen, (No. 95-3996ND) (citations omitted). Of course, one
might argue that the FWS could only purchase what landowners were willing to sell. One might ask
why not direct the anger at the landowners instead of the FWS.
58. E.g., Werner, 581 F.2d 168; United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974).
59. See Sen. Con. Res. 4048, 44th Leg. (N.D. 1975), reprinted in 1975 N.D. Laws 1729 (directing
the Legislative Council to study the impact of refuge and waterfowl production area acquisitions by
the FWS on North Dakota agriculture). Interestingly, as the court in Johansen recognized twenty-one
years later, infra note 115-120, the North Dakota Legislature viewed the FWS' conveyance document
for pre-1976 easements as posing problems for North Dakota farmers. Id. Specifically, the legis-
lature's resolution stated: "[W]hereas, the [FWS has acquired] ... easements over legal subdivisions.
. rather than the actual recognized boundaries of the wetlands which prevents, in some cases, the
land outside the wetland but within the leased area, from being used to its maximum capacity for
agricultural production." Id.
60. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 21, 1977, ch. 204, § 1, 1977 N.D. Laws 461, 461-62 (withdrawing
unconditional consent to federal refuge acquisitions under the Conservation Act by reserving complete
authority and jurisdiction over all such areas) (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE §
20.1-02-18.3 (1978)); Act of Apr. 21, 1977, ch. 204, § 3, 1977 N.D. Laws 461, 462-63 (allowing
landowners to "drain any after-expanded wetland or water area in excess of the legal description in
the lease, easement, or servitude" and providing that state consent to federal acquisitions for migratory
bird refuges would be nullified if the Department of the Interior did not "agree to and comply with"
the state-imposed limitations placed upon federal easement acquisitions) (codified as amended at N.D.
CENT. CODE § 20.1-02-18.2(2) (1978)); Act of Mar. 31, 1977, ch. 426, § 1, 1977 N.D. Laws 923
(limiting all easements in North Dakota to 99 years, and requiring that the area of land encumbered by
the easement shall be specifically described) (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-02.1
(1978)).
61. United States v. North Dakota, Civ. No. Al-79-62 (D.N.D. June 4, 1980).
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States, 62 and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.63 The State
of North Dakota appealed and certiorari was granted by the United
States Supreme Court.64
C. THE IMPACT OF NORTH DAKOTA V. UNITED STATES
In North Dakota v. United States,65 there were two main issues
before the Supreme Court: (1) whether the requisite gubernatorial
consent, once given, could be revoked by the State of North Dakota, 66
and (2) whether North Dakota could impose statutory conditions on the
federal government's power to purchase further wetland easements in
the State.67 Before reaching those issues, however, the Court addressed
two preliminary arguments advanced by North Dakota.68 The Supreme
Court's holding with respect to the second of these preliminary argu-
ments is what most affects the decision in Johansen.69
62. Id.
63. United States v. North Dakota, 650 F.2d 911, 918 (8th Cir. 1981). Initially, the gubernatorial
consent issue was confused at the lower court level, where the United States successfully argued that
the gubernatorial consent provision did not govern federal acquisition of waterfowl production areas.
Id. at 913. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that neither legislative nor gubernatorial consent
was required prior to acquisition of waterfowl production areas. Id. at 916. However, by the time the
case reached the Supreme Court, the parties agreed that gubernatorial consent was required for the
United States to acquire state wetlands for waterfowl production areas. North Dakota v. United
States, 460 U.S. 300, 310 n.13 (1983).
64. North Dakota v. United States, 455 U.S. 987 (1982).
65. 460 U.S. 300 (1983). In Johansen, the United States argued that prior Eighth Circuit
decisions interpreted wetland easements to cover all wetlands on an encumbered parcel. United
States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459, 462 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Brief of Appellee at 17-19, United States
v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459, 462 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-3996ND) (arguing that Judge Benson's ruling in
United States v. Welte, 635 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.D. 1982), which was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, 696
F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1982), stood for the proposition "that all of the wetlands which are found on the tract
are covered by the easement restrictions," and also that the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States
v. Vesterso, 828 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1987), "again specifically affirmed its prior holdings that all
wetlands found within the easement boundaries are protected" (emphasis in original)). The court in
Johansen reasoned, however, that although prior circuit decisions supported this argument, the United
States had failed to acknowledge the intervening Supreme Court decision in North Dakota. Id. at
462-63. The court stated that the Supreme Court's decision "adopted a more restricted interpretation"
of federal wetlands easements. Id. at 463. This apparent controversy over the interpretation of the
Supreme Court decision accordingly warrants a closer examination of the North Dakota ruling
concerning the scope of federal wetlands easements.
66. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 311. Recall that the Wetlands Loan Act of 1961 provided that
"[n]o land shall be acquired with moneys from the migratory bird conservation fund unless the
acquisition thereof has been approved by the Governor of the State or appropriate State agency." 16
U.S.C. § 715k-5 (1994).
67. Id. at 311. At issue here was North Dakota's authority to impose retroactive conditions on
acquisitions authorized by consents already given. Id. at 316-17. Since the United States had only
acquired approximately half of the total wetland acreage previously authorized by North Dakota
governors, id. at 305, North Dakota was seeking to impose restrictions on the United States' power to
acquire further wetlands easements on the remaining 750,000 available acres. Id. at 316-17; see also
supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining the various statutes passed by the North Dakota
Legislature in 1977 which intended to restrain further federal acquisition of wetland easements in the
State).
68. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 311 n. 14.
69. Id. The first preliminary argument advanced by North Dakota was that the gubernatorial
consents authorized between 1961 and 1977 were invalid because they did not specify the particular
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In the second of the preliminary arguments, North Dakota contend-
ed that the gubernatorial consents were exhausted because the United
States had already acquired wetland easements over more acreage than
had been authorized by the consents. 70 Specifically, North Dakota
argued that the FWS was barred from acquiring further wetland ease-
ments in the State because the State's prior consents authorized acquisi-
tions over only 1,517,437 acres of land, and the FWS had already
acquired wetland easements over 4,788,300 acres.7 1 North Dakota's
contention that the FWS had already acquired easements covering
4,788,300 acres stemmed from the FWS practice of including legal
descriptions of entire tracts of land in the actual easement conveyance
instrument. 72
The Supreme Court conceded that the gubernatorial consent limits
would have been exhausted if in fact the entire tracts of land counted
against the acreage permitted by the consents.7 3 The Court concluded,
however, that the easement restrictions applied only to wetland areas and
not to the entire tract of land. 74 Therefore, the Court held that guberna-
torial consent acreage limitations applied only to the wetlands within a
parcel, and not to the entire parcel as legally described in conveyance
instrument. 75 The Supreme Court's holding here is primarily what gave
parcels of land that were to be acquired. Id. The Court reasoned that neither the language of the
enabling statute nor its legislative history suggested that parcel-by-parcel consent was necessary. Id.
Moreover, since'the enabling statute required consent only with respect to the "nature of the lands
[and the acreage] involved," the county-by-county consents as given satisfied this standard. Id.
70. Id. at 311 n.14.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also supra note 9 (discussing the pre-1976 FWS practice of including the legal
description of the entire tract of land in the easement conveyance instrument).
73. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 311 n.14.
74. Id. Specifically, the Court stated: "The fact that the easement agreements include legal
descriptions of much larger parcels does not change the acreage of the wetlands over which easements
have been acquired." Id. (emphasis added). Notably, the Court relied upon the interrogatory
answers of then FWS Director, Lynn A. Greenwalt, in reaching this conclusion. Id. Specifically,
when Greenwalt was asked what the total acreage (wetland and upland) of permanent easements as
Waterfowl Production Areas was in North Dakota, he responded: "[tihe total acreage described in
the permanent easements for Waterfowl Production Areas acquired in North Dakota by the Fish and
Wildlife Service, USDI, is 4,788,300 acres; however, the easement restrictions on draining, burning,
filling, and leveling only apply to 764,522 wetland acres ." Appellants' Brief at 20, United States v.
Johansen, 93 F.3d 459 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-3996ND) (citing to Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's
First Set of Interrogatories and Response to Defendant's First Request for Production of Documents,
United States v. North Dakota, Civ. No. A1-79-62 (doc. #9, filed July 24, 1979)) (emphasis added).
The FWS Director also stated that the 764,522 acreage figure was computed from the "summation of
the wetland acres reported on the Easement Summary Sheets for all waterfowl production areas
acquired in North Dakota." Johansen, 93 F.3d at 64 n.7.
75. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 311 n.14. However, a different, and arguably valid, interpretation
was given to this ruling by the National Audubon Society in its amicus brief filed in support of the
United States' petition for rehearing en banc. The Audubon Society argued:
[The Supreme Court rejected the argument] ... that progress toward the 1.5 million cap
should be measured by reference to the legal description of the entire parcels on which
the wetlands are located. That is all the Court decided in its brief discussion of the issue.
The Court did not arrive at any conclusion about the actual acreage of wetlands
easements the United States had acquired relative to the 1.5 million cap, much less
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the court in Johansen the basis for its narrow interpretation of the
Johansen easements.76
After rejecting the preliminary arguments advanced by North
Dakota,77 the Court addressed the validity of North Dakota's 1977
legislation that intended to restrain further federal acquisitions of wet-
land easements in the State.78 Of relevance to this Comment was the
North Dakota statute which purported to limit boundaries of wetlands
previously acquired by the United States. 79 Specifically, this statute
permitted landowners to "drain any after-expanded wetland or water
area in excess of the legal description in the easement."80 North Dakota
sought to retroactively apply the statute to wetland easements already
endorsed the [Johansens'] position in this litigation that the United States is bound to
specific acreages in the [FWS'] 'Easement Summary' and other documents derived
from those calculations.
Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Nat'l Audubon Soc'y in Support of Petition by the U.S. for
Rehearing at 8-9, Johansen, (No. 95-3996ND) (emphasis added). A narrow reading of the Supreme
Court's ruling in North Dakota certainly supports the Audubon Society's position. The court in
Johansen at least impliedly acknowledged some ambiguity with respect to this particular ruling. See
infra note 119 and accompanying text.
76. See Johansen, 93 F.3d at 465 n.8 (stating that the Supreme Court's "treatment of this
argument implicitly suggests... that the 'acreage' is a set figure and not subject to fluctuation.").
77. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing North Dakota's two preliminary
arguments which the Court rejected in footnote 14 of its decision). The Court also rejected the
argument that the gubernatorial consents, even if valid and not exhausted, had been effectively
revoked by the State. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 312. North Dakota based its argument on the notion
that § 715k-5 required not only the initial consent of the State's governor, but also that this consent
must be continual. Id. That is, the governor must continue to consent until the moment the land is
acquired. Id. Therefore, because the FWS had only acquired wetland easements over approximately
half the acreage consented to by its governors, North Dakota argued that it could terminate the United
States' power to acquire the remaining acreage. Id. Finding the language of the Wetlands Loan Act
to be "uncomplicated," the Court concluded that nothing in the statute authorized the withdrawal of
consent previously given. Id. at 312-13. Nor did the Court find anything in the legislative history
indicating Congress' desire to permit governors to revoke their consent once given. Id. at 313. Noting
the role of the State once consent is given, the Court stated:
We are unwilling to assume that Congress, while expressing its firm belief in the need to
preserve additional wetlands, so casually would have undercut the United States' ability
to plan for their preservation. Clearly, Congress intended the States to play an important
role in the planning process. But once plans have been made and the Governor's
approval has been freely given, the role of the State is at an end.
Id. at 315. Therefore, the Court held that gubernatorial consent could not be revoked once given. Id.
at 321.
78. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 316.
79. Id. at 317-19 (discussing the validity of N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-02-18.2(2) which permitted
landowners to "drain any after-expanded wetland or water area in excess of the legal description in
the easement..."). The other two North Dakota statutes challenged were sections 20.1-02-18.1 and
47-05-02.1. Id. at 316-320. The former imposed conditions on previously approved acquisitions,
while the latter limited easements conveyed in the state to 99 years. Id.. Here again, the premise that
previously given consent is irrevocable invalidated North Dakota's argument concerning the two
statutes. Id. at 317-321. The Court reasoned that the State could not impose conditions on previously
approved acquisitions since it could not revoke its consent even if the conditions were not met. Id. at
317. The Court held that North Dakota's legislation could not restrict the United States' further
acquisition of wetlands easements pursuant to the previously given gubernatorial consents. Id. at 321.
80. Id. at 317 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-02-18.2(2) (Supp. 1981)). The United States did
not challenge the portions of section 20.1-02-18.2 which permitted landowners to "negotiate the
conditions of an easement and restrict the scope of the easement to a particular legal description." Id.
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purchased by the federal government.81 However, the Court disagreed
with a scheme that imposed restrictions on easements acquired under
previously given consents, and held that the statute was hostile to federal
law.8 2 More importantly to the Johansen case, however, is the Supreme
Court's ruling that the United States may incorporate into easement
agreements restrictions on wetlands outside the bounds of the easement
itself.8 3 The Supreme Court's ruling regarding after-expanded wetlands
may demonstrate that the figures in the Easement Summaries are not an
absolute limit on the amount of wetlands subject to easement restrictions
during wet years.8 4
D. THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. VESTERSO
In United States v. Vesterso,85 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
81. Id. at 319.
82. Id. at 318. The Court interpreted section 20.1-02-18.2 to be contrary to a standard clause that
was a part of post-1976 federal wetland easement conveyance instruments. Id. at 317. That clause
expressly prohibited the draining of after-expanded wetlands, and thus North Dakota's statute would
"void such clauses even when agreed to by the landowner." Id. Therefore, to the extent that the
state statute authorized landowners to drain after-expanded wetlands contrary to terms of the
easement agreement, it was hostile to federal law and could not be applied to easements acquired
pursuant to consents already given. Id. at 319. The Court quoted approvingly the following language
from United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973): "To permit state abrogation of
the explicit terms of a federal land acquisition would deal a serious blow to the congressional scheme
contemplated by the Migratory Bird Conservation Act .... North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 318.
83. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 319. The crucial language is as follows:
The United States is authorized to incorporate into easement agreements such rules and
regulations as the Secretary of the Interior deems necessary for the protection of
wildlife, and these rules and regulations may include restrictions on land outside the legal
description of the easement. To respond to the inherently fluctuating nature of wetlands,
the Secretary has chosen to negotiate easement restrictions on after-expanded wetlands
as well as those described in the easement itself. As long as North Dakota landowners
are willing to negotiate such agreements, the agreements may not be abrogated by state
law.
Id (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
84. In fact, the United States forcefully argued in its petition for rehearing that the Johansen
court's holding, that federal wetlands easements are limited to the acreage as specified in the
Easement Summaries, contradicted the Supreme Court's ruling regarding "after-expanded wetlands."
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 8-9 (filed Oct. 2, 1996), United States
v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-3996ND). See infra notes 153-60 (analyzing the
United States' argument that the holding in Johansen contradicts the Supreme Court's ruling in North
Dakota regarding "after-expanded wetlands").
85. 828 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1987). The United States argued in its motion in limine that the
holding in Vesterso precluded the Johansens from asserting their "acreage defense" at trial.
Appellants' Brief at 24, Johansen (No. 95-3996ND); see supra note 17 (explaining what the
Johansens' "acreage defense" means in the context of this case). The district court agreed that such a
defense was improper based on the circuit's prior holding in Vesterso. United States v. Johansen, No.
C3-95-62, slip op. at 1-2 (D.N.D. Nov. 14, 1995) (granting United States' motion in limine).
Specifically, the district court stated:
The United States seeks to exclude the 'acreage limitation defense' set forth in defend-
ants' briefs. The defense is improper in this case. The language of United States v.
Vesterso, 828 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1987), is clear as to what the government must prove.
As in Vesterso, a defense may not be based on gubernatorial consents .... or on re-
sulting easement summaries or summary records. The United States motion in limine...
is therefore GRANTED.
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affirmed the convictions of three water resource district board members
for damaging wetlands subject to federal easements in Towner County,
North Dakota. 86 The case was defended in part on the basis that the
United States had failed to establish that the wetlands damaged by the
defendants were actually encumbered by federal wetland easements. 87
Specifically, the defendants maintained that the FWS had acquired more
wetland acres in Towner County than had been authorized by the
gubernatorial consents. 88 The defendants therefore argued that since the
United States had not established which wetlands were within the guberna-
torial limitations, it had not been established beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendants had damaged federal property.89 At trial, the defen-
dants attempted to submit evidence that Towner County's acreage limita-
tion was 27,000 acres, and that county acreage actually encumbered with
wetland easements totaled over 150,000 acres. 90 The Vesterso court held,
however, that the trial court properly denied these offers of proof.91
The court in Vesterso based its holding on the fact that both the
Supreme Court and prior Eighth Circuit decisions had established that
gubernatorial consent acreage limitations applied to established "wet-
land[s] within a parcel and not to the entire parcel subject to the
easement." 92 The court interpreted the pertinent language from North
Id. at I.
In discussing the district court's pretrial order, the Johansen court stated that the decision was
"predicated on a fundamental (albeit understandable) misinterpretation" of Eighth Circuit precedent
concerning the scope of federal wetlands easements. United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459, 468 (8th
Cir. 1996). The apparent contradictory interpretations of the Eighth Circuit decision accordingly
warrants a closer examination of Vesterso and its ruling concerning the scope of federal wetlands
easements.
86. United States v. Vesterso, 828 F.2d 1234, 1245 (8th Cir. 1987). In the 1960s, the United
States purchased wetland easements in Towner County, North Dakota, pursuant to the Stamp Act. Id.
at 1236. In 1983, the Towner County Water Resource District Board began planning for two drainage
projects. Id. at 1236-37. The projects essentially cut a ditch through three parcels of property that
were encumbered by federal wetland easements. Id. at 1237. Kent Vesterso was one of the board
members involved in the planning of the projects. Id. The United States prosecuted Vesterso and
others for damaging federal property. Id. at 1238. The pre-1976 wetland easements violated in
Vesterso are identical to those that encumber the Johansens' land. Compare Vesterso, 828 F.2d at
1237 n.2 (quoting the text of one of the easements at issue), with supra note 2 (quoting relevant
language from one of the Johansens' easements).
87. Vesterso, 828 F.2d at 1241.
88. Id.
89. Id. Notably, this argument advanced by the defendants in Vesterso is arguably very similar to
the "acreage defense" which the Johansens attempted to raise in the district court. See infra note 135
and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between these two similar arguments, and the
Johansen court's justification for not interpreting Vesterso as precluding the Johansens' "acreage
defense").
90. Vesterso, 828 F.2d at 1241. Notably, this evidentiary offer of proof is premised on essentially
the same argument advanced by the State of North Dakota in the North Dakota litigation to support its
contention that the previously given gubernatorial consents were exhausted and thus the corresponding
easements were invalid. See supra note 70-75 and accompanying text (discussing North Dakota's
argument that the gubernatorial consents given by the State had been exhausted and accordingly the
FWS was barred from acquiring further wetland easements in the State).
91. Vesterso, 828 F.2d at 1241.
92. Id.; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing and citing the language in
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Dakota to mean that wetland easement restrictions did not apply to entire
parcels of property despite the entire parcel being described in the
easement document's legal description. 93 This, the court reasoned, was
because there were certain portions of property within the entire parcel
that did not meet the definition of a wetland as expressed in the easement
agreements. 94 The court concluded that this interpretation met the pur-
pose of "identifying acreage limitations in the gubernatorial consents"
which was to limit amount of state property subject to the wetland
easement restrictions. 95
Based on this interpretation, the Vesterso court determined the
United States' burden of proof in wetland violation cases. 96 First, the
United States was not required to legally describe each wetland subject to
the easement restrictions in order to establish that the county guberna-
torial consent acreage limits have not been exceeded. 97 Second, if the
United States proved the presence of recorded easements that clearly
described the terms and the existence of "identifiable wetlands" on the
parcel, this would sufficiently prove that the United States had a property
interest in the wetlands on the parcel. 98 Accordingly, the court held that
it was "sufficient for the United States to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that identifiable wetlands were damaged and that those wetlands
were within parcels subject to federal easements." 99  Therefore, until
North Dakota regarding the gubernatorial consent limitation argument advanced by the State of North
Dakota).
93. Vesterso, 828 F.2d at 1242.
94. Id. Specifically, the court stated that "the restrictions mentioned in the easement agreements
do not apply to portions of property, which, although included within the easements' legal description,
do not meet the definition of a wetland as expressed in the easement agreements." Id. (emphasis
added).
95. Id. Although the court does not explain what "identifying acreage limitations in the
gubernatorial consents" means, the author assumes that the court is referring to the FWS practice of
specifying the number of wetland acres purchased in the separate Easement Summary documents.
See Sagsveen, supra note 9, at 684-85 (describing the pre-1976 FWS practice of including the legal
description of the entire tract of land, i.e., half section, quarter section, in the easement conveyance
instrument).
96. Vesterso, 828 F.2d at 1242. The district court characterized Vesterso as setting the standard
of "what the government must prove" in a wetland violation case. United States v. Johansen, No.
C3-95-62, slip op. at 1 (D.N.D. Nov. 14, 1995) (granting United States' motion in limine).
97. Vesterso, 828 F.2d at 1242. The court supported this holding based on a ruling by the
Supreme Court in North Dakota. Id. at 1241-42 (stating that North Dakota "established that the
acreage limitation in the gubernatorial consents applies to the established wetland within a parcel and
not to the entire parcel subject to the easement"). The Vesterso court also noted the impact that the
gubernatorial consents have on federal wetlands easement agreements. Id. at 1242. The court, noting
the role of the gubernatorial consent, stated that "[tihe gubernatorial consent to the acquisition of the
federal easements described in the easement agreements has already been given. It cannot now have
an effect on that property interest." Id. The court reasoned that although the Stamp Act requires
gubernatorial consent and limits the total acreage that may be subject to federal easements, alleged
discrepancies cannot be raised when gubernatorial consent has previously been given and the United
States has presented a recorded easement describing the wetlands in clear terms. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. Notably, the court in Vesterso did not clearly explain how the United States would be able
to prove that "identifiable wetlands were damaged." Id. In other words, in situations involving
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Johansen, the court in Vesterso had seemingly determined the govern-
ment's burden of proof in cases involving federal wetland easement
violations. 100
III. CASE ANALYSIS
In Johansen, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the
scope of three federal wetland easements that encumbered farmland in
Steele County, North Dakota.lOl Specifically, the court addressed the
issue of whether federal wetland drainage restrictions applied to all the
pre-1976 easements, how was the government to prove that "identifiable wetlands" were damaged,
since pre-1976 easements give no description (of size or location) of the particular wetlands on the
tract of land? The fact that that question was left open to interpretation in Vesterso, is arguably the
reason that nine years after Vesterso pre-1976 easements are still being interpreted as to scope. Now
that this question of interpretation has been answered by the court in Johansen, the question remains
whether the decision in Johansen is supported by, or consistent with, the ruling in Vesterso. In that
vein, it is significant to note that Vesterso recognized that there are limitations to the number of acres
the federal government may acquire. Id. at 1241. Specifically, the court stated that "the clear
purpose of identifying acreage limitations in the gubernatorial consents [was] to limit the amount of
property that can be subject to [easement] restrictions." Id. at 1242. The court's recognition of the
Congressionally authorized and State-imposed acreage limitations, arguably supports the Johansen
court's narrow interpretation of pre-1976 easements. Cf. United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459, 466
(8th Cir. 1996) (stating that "we believe it more prudent to ... interpret[] the easements' scope in a
matter that fixes the federal acreage counted against the gubernatorial consent limitation"). An
alternative argument could be made, however, that certain language in Vesterso also recognized, as
the Supreme Court did in North Dakota, that the FWS was given the authority to negotiate easements in
a way that "respond[s] to the inherently fluctuating nature of wetlands." North Dakota v. United
States, 460 U.S. 300, 319 (1983). For example, the court in Vesterso states that easement restrictions
do not apply to those acres on the tract that "although included within the easement's legal description,
do not meet the definition of a wetland" as expressed in the easement itself." Vesterso, 828 F.2d at
1242 (emphasis added). The argument could be made that Vesterso impliedly recognized that
easement restrictions are not confined to the acreage amount as specified in the Easement Summaries
because of the inherently fluctuating nature of a prairie pothole wetland. See id. This proposition is
supported by the view in the wetland ecology field that formulation of a definition for wetlands is
"difficult... because wetlands represent transitional zones between upland and aquatic ecosystems,
and wetlands therefore exhibit some characteristics of each." B AwAssARRE, supra note 26, at 44 4-46
(emphasis added). Workable and recognized definitions, however, do exist. As an example, a
definition of wetlands that is agreed upon by the FWS, Natural Resource Conservation Service,
Environmental Protection Agency, and US. Army Corps of Engineers states:
Wetlands possess three essential characteristics: (1) hydrophytic vegetation, (2) hydric
soils, and (3) wetland hydrology, which is the driving force creating all wetlands. These
characteristics and their technical criteria for identification ... are mandatory and must
all be met for an area to be identified as wetland. Therefore, areas that meet these
criteria are wetlands.
Id. at 447 (citing to the Mandatory Technical Criteria for Wetland Identification as agreed upon by the
previously mentioned agencies). To illustrate further, hydric soils, which are "especially useful in
identifying wetland boundaries," are those soils that are flooded long enough (usually seven to ten
days) during a growing season to support the growth of plants called "hydrophytes." Id. at 446.
Therefore, although the Vesterso court did not explicitly explain how the United States would be able
to prove that "identifiable wetlands were damaged," the preceding definition of a wetland could
provide a way to do so. Moreover, this definition, serving as a means to prove "identifiable wetlands"
were damaged, would accommodate the Supreme Court's recognition that the FWS was necessarily
given the authority to negotiate easements in a way that "respond[s] to the inherently fluctuating
nature of wetlands." North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 319.
100. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (stating that the district court in this case
characterized the language in Vesterso as making it "clear as to what the government must prove").
101. United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459, 462-63 (8th Cir. 1996).
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wetlands found on an encumbered tract of land, or were limited to the
"wetland acres" as specified in the administrative Easement
Summaries. 102 Judge Heaney, writing for a unanimous panel, adopted a
narrower interpretation of the Johansens' wetlands easements than that
advocated by the United States,103 and than that given to similar
easements in past Eighth Circuit decisions.104 The court held that federal
wetland easement restrictions are limited to the "wetland acres" as
specified in the accompanying administrative Easement Summaries.105
The court therefore reversed the district court's evidentiary ruling
denying the Johansens' "acreage defense."1 06
To determine whether the Easement Summaries were indeed rele-
vant evidence, the Johansen court first found it necessary to review how
similar wetland easements had been previously interpreted.107 In that
vein, the United States argued that prior decisions by the Eighth Circuit
expressly interpreted the wetland easement restrictions to encompass all
wetlands on an encumbered parcel.' 0 8 The court conceded that the
United States' argument was not unreasonable for two reasons. 109 First,
the legal description in the easement conveyance instruments did in fact
describe the entire farmland tract.110 Second, Circuit case law, at least
until the early 1980s, supported the United States' broad interpretation
that the easement restrictions prohibited drainage on any portion of an
encumbered tract of land.111 The court concluded, however, that the
102. Id. at 463-64; see also Sagsveen, supra note 9 (explaining that this case arose in large part
due to the pre-1976 FWS practice of having easement conveyance documents describe the wetland
easement as encumbering the entire tract, while the accompanying Easement Summaries represented
that the FWS purchased specific quantities of wetland acreage on the tract).
103. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 463. The United States maintained that there were "no uncovered
wetlands on [the Johansens'] property." Brief of Appellee at 20, United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d
459 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-3996ND).
104. Id. at 465; see also infra note Ill (citing Eighth Circuit decisions which interpreted similar
federal wetland easements more broadly).
105. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 468.
106. Id.
107. id. at 463-64.
108. Id. at 463. The court characterized this argument as suggesting that "all wetlands found on
an encumbered tract at any given time are covered by the easement and cannot be drained in any
fashion." The Johansens, relying primarily on the Easement Summaries, argued that the easements
covered only a portion of their property and not every wetland that might develop during any given
year. Id. at 463-64.
109. Id. at 464.
110. Id.; see also Sagsveen, supra note 9, at 685-86 and accompanying text (describing the
pre-1976 FWS practice of including the legal description of the entire tract of land, that is, half
section, quarter section, in the easement conveyance instrument).
111. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 464; see, e.g., United States v. Seest, 631 F.2d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1980)
(holding that ditching parcel, although not diminishing the surface water, altered the natural flow of
surface and subsurface water, violating the terms of the wetland easement); United States v. Albrecht,
496 F.2d 906, 912 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that a federal wetland easement was not void because the
United States acquired the easement over an entire section of land); United States v. Welte, 635 F.
Supp. 388, 389 (D.N.D. 1982) (holding that the government was not required to separately identify the
22 acres delineated in the Easement Summaries, since the government had "obtained its easement on
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Supreme Court decision in North Dakota v. United States11 2 rejected the
broader interpretation that had been established by the Eighth Circuit. 113
Regarding the North Dakota litigation, the Johansen court empha-
sized the position the United States took in response to North Dakota's
argument that the FWS had exceeded gubernatorial consent acreage
limitations.1 4 The court noted that for the purposes of gubernatorial
consent acreage limitations, the United States had maintained that it
acquired easements over only 764,522 wetland acres, a figure based on
acreage figures specified in the Easement Summaries. 115 In other words,
for purposes of the North Dakota litigation, the United States took the
position that it acquired easements only over the number of acres that
corresponded with the acreage listed as "wetland acres" in the Easement
Summaries.11 6 Yet, in Johansen, the United States argued that all
wetland acres within a particular easement tract were subject to drainage
restrictions.117 Noting the contradiction in positions, the Johansen court
all 160 acres").
112. 460 U.S. 300(1983).
113. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 465 (citing to North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 311 n.14). The decision in
United States v. Welte, 635 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.D. 1982), a case decided just prior to the North Dakota
decision and involving a defense theory similar to the Johansens' acreage defense, illustrates the
change in interpretation of pre-1976 wetland easements by the Supreme Court. In Welte, the
defendant was convicted of ditching through a pothole on land encumbered by an easement idenitical
to the Johansens' easements. Id. at 388-89. In his defense, Welte asserted that the United States had
not proven that the drained land was part any property covered by the easement. Id. at 389. This
contention, like the Johansens' acreage defense, was based upon the acreage as specified in the
Easement Summaries, which in this case stated that the easement tract included 22 acres of wetlands.
Id. In rejecting the defense, the district court concluded that "[h]ad the government obtained an
easement on only 22 acres, appellant would have a valid point. The government obtained its easement
on all 160 acres, however." Id. Yet, only one year later, the Supreme Court held that the easements'
draining restrictions did not cover the entire tract of land, but instead applied only to the wetlands as
accounted for by the FWS. North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 n.14 (1983). Recall that
the wetlands accounted for by the FWS corresponded to the "summation of the wetland acres reported
on the Easement Summary Sheets for all waterfowl production areas acquired in North Dakota." See
supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the reliance by the Supreme Court on the FWS'
position during interrogatories interposed at the district court level of the North Dakota litigation).
114. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 464-65. Specifically, the United States made the following argument in
its brief before the Supreme Court:
Largely because of the peculiar nature of waterfowl production area country . . . the
Secretary has not attempted to acquire easements based on metes and bounds
descriptions of the individual wetlands or potholes. Rather, he has adopted the practice
of acquiring easements covering all of the wetlands occurring on a given described legal
subdivision. Thus, while the easement instrument describes a legal subdivision, the
easement restrictions apply only to the wetlands occurring on that subdivision.
Brief of the United States at 18, North Dakota (No. 81-773) (emphasis in original).
115. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 464.
116. Id. at 464-65 (emphasis added). Specifically, the Johansen court noted: "[Flor the
purposes of [the North Dakota] litigation, the United States contended that the wetland easement
restrictions applied only to the thirty-three, thirty-three, and thirty-five acres on the Johansens' tracts.
The Supreme Court accepted the federal government's interpretation of the easement restrictions."
Id. at 465. The Johansen court found support for the conclusion that the Supreme Court accepted the
United States' position in footnote 14 of the North Dakota case. See Id. at 465 (quoting approvingly
the language from footnote 14); see also supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's holding from footnote 14).
117. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 465; see Appellee's Reply Brief to North Dakota's Amicus Brief at 3,
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stated that the implication of the United States' position in North Dakota
could only mean in the context of this case that "the United States
acquired easements over thirty-three acres on tracts 21X and 24X and
thirty-five acres on tract 30X."ll8
The court was careful to note, however, that although the Supreme
Court in North Dakota had accepted the United States' argument limit-
ing the easement restrictions to the encumbered parcels' wetlands, the
Court had not explicitly limited the wetland easements to the number of
wetland acres as specified in the Easement Summaries. 119 Nonetheless,
the Johansen court concluded that while the Supreme Court's language
in North Dakota could be interpreted to include all wetlands on a tract
covered by an easement, such an interpretation would give rise to a
"host of problems." 120
Specifically, the court contemplated two problems that would accom-
pany the adoption of the United States' interpretation whereby the
easement restrictions covered all wetlands on an encumbered parcel.121
First, if easement restrictions applied to all wetlands on an encumbered
parcel, then the number of wetland acres subject to easement restrictions
would fluctuate in any given year with the amount of rainfall. 122 Such
fluctuation would be inconsistent with FWS wetland summaries that
annually report the number of wetland acres under its control. 12 3
Fluctuating wetland acres would also be inconsistent with the norms of
real property conveyance. 124 Furthermore, such a broad interpretation
Johansen (No. 95-3996ND) (responding to the State of North Dakota's contention that terms in the
Easement Summaries place restrictions upon the federal governments property rights in addition to
those contained in the easement agreements themselves). Specifically, the United States made the
following argument:
There is simply nothing inconsistent between the [FWS] conceding that only the wetlands
within the larger tract [are] covered by the drainage limitations and therefore that only
that acreage counted against the 'county consents' and the [FWS] at the same time
contending that all wetlands within a particular easement tract are subject to its
limitations. Quite to the contrary, that is precisely what the easement requires. By its
specific terms, the limitations only apply to the wetlands and it applies to all wetlands.
Id. (emphasis in original).
118. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 465.
119. Id. The Johansen court uses the term "Summary Acreage" here. Id. Presumably, this is
meant to represent the number of wetland acres specified in the Easement Summaries. Id at 462, 468.
120. Id. at 465-66.
121. Id. at 466.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court noted that the FWS publishes annual summaries in which it continues to
represent that it controls 33, 33, and 35 acres of wetland on the tracts in question Id. at 462. For over
thirty years, in fact, the FWS has officially reported to Congress that they control by easements, 33, 33,
and 35 acres respectively on the tracts in question. Appellants' Brief at 33, Johansen (No.
95-3996ND).
124. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 466 (citing to RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 451 cmt. m (1944)
(requiring definiteness)).
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would preclude ditching anywhere on the legally-described tract of
land. 125
Second, the court recognized that the United States' interpretation
would create problems with the gubernatorial consent acreage limita-
tions. 126 The court reasoned that if easement restrictions fluctuated with
the number of wetland acres present on a parcel at any given time, then
so too would the wetlands counted against the gubernatorial limita-
tions. 127 This potential variation "could conceivably" exceed the guber-
natorial limitation during a wet year, and accordingly, violate the terms
of the program's enabling statute. 128 The court reasoned that to give
meaning to the gubernatorial consent provision a direct correlation must
exist between the number of wetland acres applied against gubernatorial
consents and the actual acreage encumbered by the wetland
easements. 129 The court therefore held that federal wetland easements
125. Id. Specifically, the court reasoned that under the United States' interpretation, "any action
that would inhibit the collection of water in a particular depression would violate its interest in existing
and future wetlands." Id. Thus, ditching anywhere on the parcel would impact the formation of a
wetland because these properties are typically pocketed by depressions at various depths. Id. The
United States argued forcefully in its petition for rehearing en banc that a broader interpretation of
these easements would not prevent ditching anywhere on the tract of land: "This fear is much
exaggerated. The language of the easement makes clear that it covers only the draining of 'now
existing or reoccurring' water. On its face, this language includes only periodic reoccurring wetlands,
not land which is simply covered with water in times of exceptionally heavy rainfall." United States'
Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 13, Johansen (No. 95-3996ND) (footnote omitted). Further, the
United States stated that "[i]ndeed, the [FWS] has promulgated a 'sheetwater policy,' which expressly
permits the draining of water outside of potholes or other reoccurring wetlands when the land is
flooded due to exceptionally heavy rain." Id. at 13 n.12.
126. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 466; see also supra notes 31 and 44 and accompanying text (explaining
the gubernatorial consent component of the federal wetlands program's enabling statute).
127. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 466.
128. Id. Interestingly, the court's position here was suggested by a commentator thirteen years
earlier in this law review journal. Cf. Sagsveen, supra note 9, at 686 (arguing that the FWS's failure to
describe the size and location of all wetlands subject to a wetland easement in a county could
potentially exhaust gubernatorial consent limitations and cause wetlands to lose their protection during
very wet seasons).
129. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 466. Two interesting and arguably valid arguments countering the
court's reasoning here were raised by the United States and the Audubon Society in their petition for
rehearing en banc briefs. First, the United States argued that even under the view that fluctuating
wetland acres may exceed the gubernatorial consent caps, "the solution is not to limit the extent of the
easements already taken and to ignore the unambiguous language of those easements - it would be to
limit the extent of easements which subsequently pushed the acreage figure higher than the acreage in
the governor's consent." United States' Petition for Rehearing at 14, Johansen (No. 95-3996ND).
This argument is supported by the fact that the state consent cap is on a county wide basis, rather than
on an individual basis. Interview with Lynn Crooks, Assistant United States Attorney for North
Dakota, in Fargo, North Dakota (Sept. 3, 1996) [hereinafter Interview with Crooks]. Thus, if in a
given year the consent cap was exceeded due to excessive flooding, only the last easements acquired
would be affected, and not all individual easements proportionally. Id. It follows then that since the
Johansens' easement are some of the earliest ones taken in Steele County, theirs would not be affected
by anything short of a flood of biblical proportions. Id. The Audubon Society, taking a procedural
angle, argued that there was "no basis, in the context of this case, for adopting a restricted
interpretation of the easement acreages based on a concern" that fluctuating wetlands would exceed
gubernatorial consents. Memorandum of Amicus Curaie National Audubon Society in Support of
Petition for Rehearing at 12, Johansen (No. 95-3996ND). The Audubon Society pointed out that the
Johansens', in their opening brief on appeal, affirmed the fact that the gubernatorial consent limitation
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purchased prior to 1976 were limited to the acreage provided in the Ease-
ment Summaries. 130
Based on its interpretation of the easements in question, the court
addressed the United States' motion in limine to the district court. 13 1
The United States had argued that the court in United States v.
Vesterso132 rejected the notion of limiting wetland easement restrictions
to the wetland acres listed in the Easement Summaries. 133 However, to
interpret Vesterso in a manner consistent with this opinion, the court
explained that the language of Vesterso must be understood within the
context of the opinion. 134 Vesterso, the court explained, simply rejected
the defendants' argument that the United States failed to comply with
the program's gubernatorial limitations by not "identifying all wetlands
covered by the federal easements." 135 In other words, Vesterso stood for
for Steele County, North Dakota did not exceed the acres authorized. Id. (citing to Appellants' Brief
at 11-12, Johansen (No. 95-3996ND)). Therefore, the Johansen court's concern for gubernatorial
consent caps being exceeded was irrelevant to the resolution of the instant case. Id. Neither of the
preceding arguments were advanced by the United States in its opening brief on appeal, but only upon
petitioning for rehearing en banc.
130. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 466. The court stated that this interpretation has the "additional
advantage" of being consistent with "prior representations by the federal government of its interest in
the properties." Id. at 466-67. Specifically, the court noted the United States' position taken in North
Dakota, 460 U.S. at 311 n. 14, and the wetland acreage totals as reported in the FWS Annual Survey.
Id.; see supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the position taken by the FWS during
interrogatories interposed at the district court level of the North Dakota litigation).
131. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 467.
132. 828 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1987).
133. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 467.
134. Id. The court concluded that the United States had taken the Vesterso language out of
context. Id.
135. Id. The court is apparently referring to the following argument made in Vesterso by the
defendants:
The [defendants] claim that the United States did not establish that the wetlands damaged
in this case were actually covered by federal easements. According to the appellants,
Congress allowed the State to limit the number of acres which could be subject to federal
easements. The [defendants] assert that the limit established by the State has been
exceeded. Because it has not been established which wetlands were within the limitation
and which were without it, it has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt that the
appellants damaged federal property.
Vesterso, 828 F.2d at 1241; see also supra notes 88-91 (discussing the holding from Vesterso regarding
this argument). This argument advanced by the defendants in Vesterso is arguably very similar to the
"acreage defense" which the Johansens asserted in this case. In fact, the United States argued in its
appellate brief that the defense offered by the defendants in Vesterso, and rejected by the that court,
was the same as the argument advanced by the Johansens in their "acreage defense." Specifically,
the United States argued:
In Vesterso . . . the defendants, like the [Johansens], apparently thought they saw a
possible change in the law in footnote 14 of the Supreme Court opinion [in North
Dakota]. [The defendants in Vesterso] argued that the Supreme Court was limiting the
coverage of the easements to the precise number of wetland acres contained in the
wetland summaries. This court disagreed ... [and] affirmed the district court's refusal
of an offer of proof, again based upon wetland summaries, which purported to show that
while the United States had only been authorized 27,000 wetland acres, it had actually
encumbered 151,743.
Brief of Appellee at 17-18, Johansen (No. 95-3996ND). Arguably, the United States' argument here
is slightly misplaced. The Johansens' "acreage defense" theory did not involve an evidentiary offer
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the proposition that under pre-1976 easements the United States need
not legally describe the confines of each covered wetland to comply with
gubernatorial consent limitations, an issue that had already been decided
by the Supreme Court in North Dakota.136 Therefore, the Vesterso lan-
guage was not to be read as prohibiting draining of any wetland on an
encumbered parcel.137
The Johansen court next distinguished the government's burden of
proof as established in Vesterso and that required as a result of the hold-
ing in this case. 138 The holding in Vesterso, the court explained, meant
that the United States must prove that "identifiable, covered wetlands (as
existing at the time of the easement's conveyance and described in the
Easement Summary) were damaged," and that the Johansens knew the
parcel was encumbered by a federal easement. 139
Finally, the court pointed to two other factors to further support
this "revised interpretation." 140 First, the court referred to cautionary
language at the end of the Vesterso opinion which, the court claimed,
further clarified the meaning of the Vesterso holding with respect to the
government's burden of proof.141 That is, the Vesterso court had
cautioned landowners that the first step before undertaking any drainage
on encumbered tracts of land was to consult with the FWS. 142 The court
of proof whereby they alleged that particular easements were invalid because gubernatorial consents
had been exhausted. In fact, the Johansens conceded that the "FWS has not exceeded the governor's
9,618 wetlands acres cap in Steele County, North Dakota, because under [North Dakota] it is clear the
FWS has acquired only 3,977 acres of wetlands easements in Steele County." Appellants' Brief in
Response to Government's Petition for Rehearing En Banc, at 8-9, Johansen (No. 95-3996ND).
Rather, the Johansens' "acreage defense" is built on the premise that for pre-1976 wetland easements,
the easement restrictions apply only to those wetlands which correspond to the number of acres as
specified in the Easement Summaries. Supra note 17 (explaining the "acreage defense"). Though this
distinction was not discussed by the Johansen court in its opinion, it does support the court's holding
which narrowed the interpretation of prior Eighth Circuit decisions involving wetland easements.
136. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 467.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 467-68.
139. Id. at 467 (emphasis and parentheses in original). Notably, the Johansen court just adds a
few clarifying words to the pertinent language from Vesterso. Compare Vesterso, 828 F.2d at 1242
(stating that "[the United States must prove] that identifiable wetlands were damaged and that those
wetlands were within parcels subject to federal easements"), with Johansen, 93 F.3d at 467 (stating
that "[the United States must prove] that identifiable, covered wetlands (as existing at the time of the
easement's conveyance and described in the Easement Summary) were damaged and the defendant
knew that the parcel was subject to a federal easement") (emphasis added in both quotations).
140. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 467-68.
141. Id. at 467.
142. Id. The Johansen court is referring to the following language from Vesterso:
We point out, however, that the State of North Dakota and landowners are not without
recourse if the easements cause flooding, for example, which results from nonnatural
obstructions to water flow. The prudent course in any event requires consultation with
the [FWSJ before undertaking drainage on parcels covered by easements.
Id. (citing to Vesterso, 829 F.2d at 1245) (emphasis added by court). In the author's opinion, this
statement by the Vesterso court implicitly acknowledged that in years of excessive moisture, drainage
would be a normal course of action, so long as such action was predicated by consultation with the
FWS.
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noted that the Johansens had sought cooperation with the FWS in their
efforts to contain the flooding that covered their farmland, but that the
cooperation envisioned by the court in Vesterso was not forthcoming.143
Second, the court referred to United States v. Schoenborn,144 a federal
wetlands violation case in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals for
the first time examined evidence showing which wetlands existed at the
time of the easement conveyance. 145 Such an examination, the Johansen
court reasoned, was a "clear departure" from the court's prior practice
of focusing on any ditching of the encumbered parcel.146 Therefore,
Schoenborn "implicitly acknowledged" a narrower interpretation of
federal wetland easements.147
Based on the foregoing analysis, the court in Johansen held that the
federal wetland easements at issue acquired title only on the amount of
acreage specified in the Easement Summaries that accompanied the ease-
ment document itself. 148 The court concluded that the language from
Vesterso required that the culpability element of this crime must be met
by proof that the defendant knew the parcel was subject to a wetland ease-
ment. 149 However, in an effort to clarify the holding in Vesterso, the
court ruled that the United States must also prove that the landowner
"drained the Summary Acreage covered by the federal wetland ease-
ment." 150 Conversely, the court reasoned, a defendant must be allowed
to introduce evidence to prove that they did not damage Summary
Acreage.151 The court therefore reversed the district court's pretrial
evidentiary ruling and remanded the case consistent with the opinion.152
143. Id.; see also supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (discussing the correspondence
between Kerry Johansen and the FWS).
144. 860 F.2d 1448 (8th Cir. 1988).
145. Schoenborn, 860 F.2d at 1453-55. In Schoenborn, the defendant was charged for damaging
federal wetland property. See id. (discussing the various easement violations caused by draining of
basins and filling of ditches). The wetland easements involved in Schoenborn were nearly identical to
pre-1976 easements in Johansen. Compare Schoenborn, 860 F.2d at 1449 (quoting part of the
easement's language), with supra note 2 (quoting language from one of the Johansens' easements).
The court in Schoenborn noted that at trial, the government produced evidence which consisted of
aerial photographs at different dates, testimony interpreting the photographs, and testimony of visual
observations. Schoenborn, 860 F.2d at 1453.






152. Id. On November 29, 1996, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the government's
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc.
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IV. IMPACT
The holding in United States v. Johansen has potentially far-reach-
ing legal and practical implications.153 First, the Johansen holding may
be contrary to a specific ruling in the Supreme Court decision North
Dakota v. United States. Second, the decision arguably deals a blow to
federal wetland preservation efforts because it effectively imposes upon
the federal government another element of proof in wetland easement
violation cases. In North Dakota alone, the decision will likely affect the
enforcement of approximately 11,000 federal wetland easements.
A. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS-JOHANSEN MAY BE CONTRARY TO SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT
The Johansen court's "revised interpretation" of the Circuit's
prior holding in Vesterso may be interpreted to be inconsistent with a
specific ruling of the Supreme Court in North Dakota. As previously
discussed, the Johansen court relied heavily on the United States'
litigating position in North Dakota (in the context of the gubernatorial
consent challenge) which maintained that it had acquired easements over
only 764,522 wetland acres, a figure based on the acreage figures
specified in the Easement Summaries. 154 The Johansen court reasoned
that the Supreme Court's adoption of that position suggested that
wetland acreage "is a set figure and not subject to fluctuation."155 The
argument could be made, however, that the Supreme Court's ruling later
in the opinion regarding "after-expanded wetlands" demonstrates that
the Court sought to avoid an absolute limit on the amount of wetlands
subject to easement restrictions during wet years. 156 For instance, the
153. This case has generated considerable discussion by parties outside the litigation. For
instance, amicus curiae briefs have been submitted by the State of North Dakota and the National
Audubon Society. See Amicus Brief of the State of North Dakota, Johansen (No. 95-3996ND);
Memorandum of Amicus Curiae National Audubon Society in Support of Petition by the United States
for Rehearing, Johansen (No. 95-3996ND). One commentator recently characterized the impact of
the Johansen case as follows:
The decision is being hailed by private property advocates as a hallmark for future
litigants who may be prosecuted for their attempts to "contain surplus water to the
protected federal wetlands" and who seek the cooperation of the government but whose
efforts are halted by the bureaucracy. The Johansen decision also should provide a
useful precedent to stymie the efforts of government to broaden the scope of tools, such
as wetlands easements, to increase regulation over private property. It will be interesting
to observe how the government--and other jurisdictions--react to this decision.
Malia Simon Kishore, Property Owners Score Victory over Wetlands Easements, NATURAL RESOURCES
& EwvmoImmEzrr, Vol. 11, No. 3, Winter 1997, at 44.
154. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 464-65; see also supra notes 74-76 and 118-123 (explaining the United
States' position, the Supreme Court's adoption of that position, and the Johansen court's emphasis on
the Court's adoption of that position).
155. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 465 n.8.
156. North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 319 (1983); see supra notes 78-84 and
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Court in North Dakota stated that in order to respond to the "inherently
fluctuating nature of wetlands," the FWS had been given Congressional
authorization to negotiate wetland easements which included restrictions
on "after-expanded wetlands."157 Thus, the Court ruled that the North
Dakota statute was hostile to federal law, to the extent that the statute
authorized drainage of "after-expanded wetlands" contrary to express
terms of previously conveyed easement agreements.1 58 It could be
argued, therefore, that this ruling should also apply to the easements
involved in this case, where the easement language included restrictions
on all "natural and reoccurring wetlands" within the entire parcel.159
By imposing an acreage limitation based on the information in the
Easement Summaries, the Johansen court granted relief which the
Supreme Court arguably denied to the State in North Dakota.
160
accompanying text (discussing the ruling that the United States may impose easement restrictions on
wetlands outside the bounds of the easement itself).
157. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 319.
158. Id. It is important to note that the Supreme Court's ruling concerned the North Dakota
statute and its relation to standard post-1976 easement agreements. See id. at 317 (referring to "[t]he
United States' standard easement agreement [which] contains a clause prohibiting the draining of
after-expanded wetlands, see n.6, supra, and § 20.1-02-18.2(2) which might be read to void such
clauses"). The easement the Supreme Court referred to in footnote 6 of its opinion is a post-1976
easement.
159. See supra note 2 (quoting language from one of the Johansens' easements). The major flaw,
however, in this argument is that the easement under discussion was a post-1976 easement, in which
the landowner negotiated and conveyed an easement covering specific wetlands and any
after-expansion of those wetlands. Therefore, this argument might be misplaced for two reasons.
First, the Supreme Court's "after-expansion" language arguably refers only to wetlands delineated on
a map, attached to and recorded with each post-1976 easement. Second, the "after-expansion"
language does not apply to any wetlands that develop after conveyance and were not included in the
accompanying map (that is, those wetlands developing during periods of extreme moisture).
160. In addition to being contrary to Supreme Court precedent, the United States also argued in
its petition for rehearing that the holding in Johansen conflicts with the Eighth Circuit precedent;
specifically, the Circuit's prior decision in United States v. Vesterso, 828 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1987).
Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 8-9, Johansen, (No. 95-3996ND); see also supra note 139 and
accompanying text (comparing the holdings of the two decisions). Although the Johansen court
characterizes its holding as a "revised interpretation" of its prior law, Johansen, 93 F.3d at 467, this
revision arguably adds another element to the federal government's burden of proof, thus effecting a
substantial change in prior Eighth Circuit law. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text
(discussing the added element to the government's burden of proof). The court in Johansen did offer
an explanation for the inconsistency between its holding and prior Eighth Circuit precedent. Johansen,
93 F.3d at 464. That is, the court reasoned that the Supreme Court decision in North Dakota rejected
prior Eighth Circuit precedent which interpreted the easements to encumber all wetlands on a parcel.
Id.; see also supra notes 105-108 (listing and explaining the Eighth Circuit cases that the Johansen
court claims were rejected by North Dakota). The United States argued, however, that the Johansen
court failed to acknowledge that the Circuit's decision in Vesterso came four years after the decision
in North Dakota. Moreover, the court disregarded the fact that Vesterso cited to North Dakota to
support its conclusion regarding the federal government's burden of proof in wetland violation cases.
Vesterso, 828 F.2d at 1242 (citing to North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 315). In fact, the Vesterso court had
relied on United States v. Welte in establishing the government's burden of proof, Vesterso, 828 F.2d at
1242 (citing to United States v. Welte, 635 F. Supp. 388, 389-90 (D. N.D. 1982)), which Johansen says
the Supreme Court rejected. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 464 (stating that the "interpretation given the
easements by this court in the early 1980s was rejected by the Supreme Court."). The court in
Johansen did not address this argument by the United States.
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B. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS-PROBLEMS WITH PROOF
Legal issues aside, the holding in Johansen, adopting a narrower
interpretation of certain federal wetland easements, deals a blow to
federal waterfowl preservation efforts by reducing the effective scope of
the easements. In addition to narrowing the scope of the easements, the
holding also makes enforcement of the easements more difficult, and
perhaps impossible. Whereas Vesterso established that the government
must prove that "identifiable" wetlands were damaged, 161 the Johansen
court added another element of proof;162 so that now the government
must also prove that the wetlands drained were "identifiable, covered
wetlands (as existing at the time of the easement's conveyance and
described in the Easement Summary)."1 63 The Johansen court's
requirement that the damaged wetlands be those existing at the time of
conveyance, and as described in the Easement Summary, presents a
problem for pre-1976 easements. Nowhere in the administrative Ease-
ment Summaries are there descriptions delineating which wetlands are
meant to be covered or where they are located, 164 as the Easement
Summaries contain a description of size only.165 As a result, the United
States, armed only with the knowledge as to the number of wetland acres
purchased, will apparently have difficulty determining exactly what
particular wetlands were intended to be covered by the easement. That
is, given the nature of prairie region wetlands,1 66 it may be difficult, if
not impossible, for the United States to establish which wetlands were
intended to be covered by an easement, and the extent to which they are
covered. 167 The United States maintains that the Easement Summaries
161. Vesterso, 828 F.2d at 1242.
162. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 467-68; see also supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text
(explaining how the Johansen court apparently added another element to be proven by the United
States in a wetlands violation case).
163. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 467 (parentheses in original).
164. See Sagsveen, supra note 9, at 686 (describing how failure of the FWS to describe the size
and location of all wetlands subject to wetland easements may jeopardize the integrity of the
easements).
165. Johansen, 93 F.3d at 462. In Johansen, the court summarized the information that was
contained in the Easement Summaries. The court stated the information "includ[ed] the tract
description, the tract acreage, the wetland acreage, and the cost of wetland per acre." Id. The
"wetland acreage" is described only in terms of number of acres. Id.
166. See North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 304 n.4 (1983) (explaining the glacial
history and nature of the prairie region wetlands); see also supra note 99 (explaining that because
prairie wetlands are continually in a state of transition, formulating a definition of a "wetland" is
difficult).
167. Appellee's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 7, Johansen (No. 95-3996ND). The United
States argued how difficult it would be to prove precisely which wetlands were intended to be covered
by a particular easement, and the extent to which each wetland was to be covered. Id. The United
States stated:
The [court's] opinion is ambiguous. It uses the term "summary acreage" to mean the
wetland acres covered by the easements, and seems to imply that this land is described in
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may be unobtainable for some parcels of land,168 which, under the
Johansen ruling, would make enforcement of the easements impossible.
Furthermore, wetland acreage estimates were generally not made from
ground inspections, but rather from reviewing aerial photographs,
sometimes taken years before acquisition.169 Often the acreage cal-
culations were merely an estimate of average wetland acreage per square
mile for the area. 170 Moreover, pre-1976 federal wetland easements did
not contain maps locating the wetlands subject to the easements. 171
Therefore, requiring the government to determine the size of the
identifiable and covered wetlands will arguably make the enforcement of
these federal wetlands easements nearly impossible.172
As it stands, the holding in Johansen has both practical and legal
implications. As discussed, the federal government's ability to enforce
several thousand wetland easements in the future is severely impaired. In
addition to its practical problems, Johansen may also stand on unstable
legal ground, as the narrow interpretation of federal wetland easements
may run counter to a specific ruling by the United States Supreme
Court. Thus, it seems that given both the practical and legal effects of




the wetlands summaries. Those summaries, however, state only an estimated amount of
wetlands covered by the easement, and do not indicate the location of those wetlands.
Id. at 7 n.8.
168. Interview with Crooks, supra note 129.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.; see also Sagsveen, supra note 9, at 686 (explaining that the prior to 1976 the FWS failed
to describe the size and location of all wetlands subject to wetland easements).
172. Id.
173. I would like to dedicate this article to two men who have been very influential in my life -
my grandfathers, Clifford Odegaard and the late Alfred Hulse, both life long farmers near Westhope,
N.D., and who because of them I was able to take interest in and appreciate the inherent dilemma in
this case - that there is a delicate balance between environmental conservation and a farmer's right
to make a living off the land.
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